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The	power	of	art,	the	power	of	entertainment	
	
Introduction	
In	the	spring	of	1897	the	Chicago	cultural	journal	the	Dial	addressed	the	
question	of	how	one	should	explain	the	importance	of	art	to	the	‘average	
Philistine’.	One	should	say:	
This	masterpiece	deserves	your	attention	…	for	it	has	the	power	to	raise	
you	to	a	higher	spiritual	level.	If	you	do	not	like	it	now,	pray	that	you	may	
learn	to	like	it,	for	the	defect	is	yours.	(quoted	in	Levine	1988,	189)	
This	quotation	comes	from	Lawrence	Levine’s	Highbrow/Lowbrow,	a	history	of	
the	emergence	of	‘entertainment’	and	‘art’	as	distinct	cultural	categories	in	
nineteenth	century	America.	Levine	argues	–	I	think	convincingly	–	that	this	
taxonomy	did	not	exist	in	its	modern	form	before	this	time	and	that	over	the	
course	of	the	nineteenth	century	culture	became	increasingly	‘hierarchically	
organised’	and	fragmented	into	‘rigid	adjectival	boxes’	(Levine	1988,	9).	
It	is	my	contention	that	Levine’s	account	points	to	a	binary	that	survives	–	not	
unchanged,	but	still	recognizable	‐	in	cultural	production	and	distribution	in	
twenty‐first	century	Western	cultures.	As	I	argue	below,	art	and	entertainment	
continue	as	distinct	cultural	systems.	And	this	has	implications	for	thinking	
about	the	‘balance	of	power	between	media	and	their	audiences’	(Napoli	2011,	
122)	–	a	topic	which	is	of	ongoing	interest	to	academic	researchers.	In	the	‘art’	
model	of	culture,	the	text	is	imagined	as	having	‘power’	over	the	audience	–	in	
this	instance,	the	‘power	to	raise	[the	consumer]	to	a	higher	level’.	By	contrast,	as	
Levine	shows,	as	entertainment	emerged	as	a	distinct	cultural	category	it	was	
defined	as	a	form	of	culture	that	operated	in	the	opposite	direction	–	it	sought	to	
be	changed	by	its	consumers.	In	this	article	I	explore	the	development	of	these	
cultural	forms,	and	the	way	in	which	various	forms	of	power	were	understood	to	
be	distributed	in	the	production	of	art	and	of	entertainment,	and	consider	
whether	such	accounts	provide	some	insight	into	understanding	the	production,	
distribution	and	consumption	of	art	media	and	entertainment	media	in	twenty	
first	century	Western	cultures.		
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The	importance	of	power	in	studying	the	media	
Horkheimer	and	Adorno’s	1944	work	on	the	‘culture	industries’	in	The	Dialectic	
of	Enlightenment	provides	an	important	stepping	on	point	for	debates	about	
media	and	power.	In	this	germinal	work,	the	philosophers	insist	that	in	
understanding	the	work	of	mass	culture	the	question	of	‘power’	is	a	vital	one:	
the	power	of	the	culture	industry	resides	in	its	identification	with	a	
manufactured	need	…	the	stronger	the	positions	of	the	culture	industry	
become,	the	more	summarily	it	can	deal	with	consumers’	needs,	producing	
them,	controlling	them,	disciplining	them.	(Horkheimer	and	Adorno	1972	
[1944],	137)	
This	work	was	paradigm‐setting.	It	provided	a	way	to	think	about	the	
functioning	of	mass	(or	popular)	culture	that	stepped	away	from	the	
straightforward	snobbery	of	an	FR	Leavis	or	a	T	S	Eliot	(Carey	1992,	7).	While	
those	writers	employed	paradigms	which	despised	mass	culture	precisely	for	
reflecting	its	consumers,	and	showing	that	they	were	indeed	a	‘complacent,	
prejudiced,	unthinking	mass’	(Carey	1992,	7),	Horkheimer	and	Adorno’s	project	
works	somewhat	differently.	They	do	not	despise	the	‘mass’	of	humanity	–	
indeed	they	want	to	speak	on	their	behalf.		But	they	do	despise	mass	culture.	By	
introducing	the	concept	of	‘power’	they	can	achieve	this	intellectual	move.	Mass	
culture,	they	argue,	does	not	represent	the	masses.	It	is	imposed	on	the	masses	
by	capitalist	institutions,	who	have	the	‘power’	to	control	what	is	seen.		
‘Power’	has	become	a	central	topic	for	thinking	about	the	role	of	the	media	and	
its	relationship	to	various	class	fractions.	Recent	debates	about	media	and	
‘relations	of	power’	(Hay	and	Couldry	2011,	480)	have	particularly	focused	on	
the	increased	audio‐visual	productivity	and	distributory	possibilities	allowed	to	
citizens	by	digital	participation:	but	they	are	still	centrally	concerned	with	‘the	
important	issues	of	power	and	control	…	in	the	Web	2.0	environment’	(Bird	
2011,	502).	Participants	in	these	debates	have	tended	to	sit	within	one	of	two	
familiar	strands	–	the	first	strand	often	labeled	‘optimistic’	(Bird	2011,	507)	or	
‘celebratory’	(Ornebring	2007,	449),	the	second	commonly	described	as	‘critical’	
(Hartley	2009,	232)	or	‘pessimistic’	(Flew	2009,	92).	Optimistic	writers	see	a	
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change	occurring	in	power	relations,	in	a	‘general	trend	of	the	increasing	power	
of	audiences	in	the	entertainment	industries’	(McNamara	2011,	526).	They	
suggest	that	‘new	media	are	increasingly	putting	the	power	to	create	and	
distribute	content	into	the	hands	of	the	audience’	(Napoli	2011,	1)	and	that	
audiences	‘increasingly	have	the	power	to	affect	the	content	they	consume’	
(Napoli	2011,	77).	By	contrast,	pessimistic	writers	insist	on	the	importance	of		
‘wider	power	structures’	(Hay	and	Couldry	2011,	483)	and	assert	that	‘the	past	
two	decades	have	offered	little	sign	of	such	a	shift	in	power’	(Couldry	2011,	497‐
498).		
But	what	does	the	word	mean?	As	is	to	be	expected	of	a	term	that	has	been	used	
by	thousands	of	academic	writers	over	a	period	of	many	decades,	the	term	
‘power’	is	a	polyvalent	one.	In	the	writing	of	Adorno	and	Horkheimer	the	term	
seems	to	be	all‐encompassing.	The	impression	one	gets	from	reading	their	work	
is	that	the	cultural	industries	are,	simply,	powerful;	the	masses	are,	simply,	
powerless.	This	is	a	model	of	power	as,	‘totalized	and	abstracted’,	‘a	single,	
objective	social	phenomenon’	(Gibson	2007,	183,	69,	73).	But	in	ongoing	debates	
about	this	topic	it	is	in	fact	common	to	find	references	to	a	whole	range	of	
different	powers:	‘economic	power’	(Andrejevic	2011,	617),	for	example,	or	
‘institutional	power’	(Couldry	2011,	495),	‘the	power	of	media	producers’	(Bird	
2011,	506),	‘cultural	power’	(Turner	2009,	25),	‘media	power’	(Madianou	2012,	
12),	‘structural	power’	(Turner	2009,	46),	or	‘structural	media	power’	(Bird	
2011,	509),	‘governmental	and	corporate	power’	(Maxwell	and	Miller	2011,	
592),	‘the	power	of	the	military‐industrial‐entertainment‐academic	complex’	
(Maxwell	and	Miller	2011,	594),	‘the	power	of	data‐crunching	and	predictive	
analytics’	(Andrejevic	2011,	618),	‘sovereign	and	network	powers’	(Bratich	
2011,	622),	‘direct	power	to	shape	media	content’	(Bratich	2011,	623),	‘the	
bullying	power	of	commercial	interests’	(Banet‐Weiser	2011,	651),	‘the	power	to	
represent’	(Madianou	2012,	6),	‘purchasing	power’	(Yang	2009,	528),	‘labor	
power’	(Ritzer	and	Jurgenson	2010,	26)	or	‘symbolic	power’	(Flew	2008,	2008)	.		
Nevertheless,	despite	this	proliferation	of	kinds	of	power,	there	remains	in	much	
of	this	analysis	a	tendency	finally	to	fall	back	on	to	the	idea	that	all	of	these	
expressions	of	power	are	expressions	of	a	single	essential	substance,	whose	
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distribution	between	various	parties	can	simply	be	measured	as	a	‘simple	
quantitative	phenomenon’	(Hindess,	quoted	in	Gibson	2007,	29).	Take	for	
example	Bird’s	formulation	of	the	question	of	‘produsers’	(consumers	who	also	
produce	online):	‘has	this	shift	in	power	really	happened,	or	does	the	celebration	
of	the	online	produser	simply	mask	the	ever‐increasing	power	of	the	media	
industry?’	(Bird	2011,	507).	As	many	writers	understand	the	situation	–	and	it	is	
true	of	pessimistic	writers	in	particular	‐	the	distribution	of	power	is	a	zero‐sum	
game:	if	one	agent	gains,	another	must	lose,	and	‘ultimately’	(Ornebring	2007,	
2007),	one	agent	must	have	more	power.		
But	Mark	Gibson	notes	that	some	academic	traditions	have	tended	to	not	to	talk	
of	‘“power”	in	general	terms,	but	more	concretely	about	specific	“powers”’	
(Gibson	2007,	x).	As	a	way	of	thinking	about	the	importance	of	this	move	he	
draws	on	the	work	of	Barry	Hindess	to	suggest	the	existence	of	‘heterogeneous	
powers’.	Imagine,	for	example,	‘an	international	dispute	in	which	tanks	are	pitted	
against	submarines’	(Hindess,	quoted	in	Gibson	2007,	31).	Who	would	prevail?	It	
depends	of	course	on	whether	the	powers	are	engaged	in	land	or	sea	battle.	
Some	kinds	of	power	are	more	useful	–	more	powerful	–	in	some	situations;	
other	forms	of	power	in	others.	
Such	a	move	answers	the	call	of	several	recent	writers	on	media	and	power.	
Verstraete	calls	for	researchers	to	move	beyond		
these	old	utopia	versus	dystopia	dyads	…	since	these	simple	oppositions	
between	power	and	resistance	prevent	us	from	seeing	the	complexities	of	
today’s	transformations	in	cultural	participation.	(Verstraete	2011,	539;	
Baym	and	Burnett	2009,	445).(Deuze	2007,	258‐259;	Gibson	2007,	167).		
This	paper	contributes	to	this	process	of	moving	beyond	the	dyad	of	optimism	
and	pessimism	to	attempt	to	trace	what	kinds	of	power	are	offered	to	producers	
and	to	consumers	in	the	production,	distribution	and	consumption	of	different	
kinds	of	culture.	
	
Art,	entertainment	and	audiences	
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Although	in	much	academic	research	there	is	an	implication	that	‘the	media’	all	
work	in	the	same	way	to	exert	power	over	consumers,	in	fact	there	exist	
different	forms	of	mediated	culture	which	are	produced,	distributed	and	
consumed	differently,	and	which	involve	different	relations	of	power	between	
producers	and	consumers.	One	key	distinction	is	that	between	art	and	
entertainment.		
Before	the	nineteenth	century	upper	and	lower	class	citizens	in	Western	
countries	shared	common	cultural	resources	(Storey	2003,	4).	Shakespeare,	for	
example,	was	presented	as	popular	entertainment.	But	over	the	course	of	the	
eighteen	and	nineteenth	centuries	cultural	elites	worked	explicitly	to	separate	
their	cultural	consumption	from	that	of	the	masses	and	the	binary	of	‘art’	versus	
‘entertainment’	was	introduced.	These	forms	of	culture	have	different	aesthetic	
systems	(McKee	2012)..	The	binary	has	never	been	simple,	and	in	the	course	of	
the	twentieth	century	it	has	been	modified	in	a	number	of	ways	–	particularly	
with	questions	about	cultural	omnivorousness	as	a	marker	of	cultural	capital	
(Warde,	Wright	and	Gayo‐Cal	2007)	and	postmodern	art	practices	(Indiana	
2010)	and	theories	of	culture	(Jameson	1991).	Nevertheless	the	distinction	
retains	an	important	position	in	the	production	and	distribution	of	culture.	
Indeed,	Scheff	and	Kotler		(Scheff	and	Kotler	1996)	argue	that	adherence	to	one	
or	other	side	of	the	low	versus	high	culture	paradigm	determines	both	the	
fundamental	orientation	and	business	performance	of	creative	organisations.	
And	in	the	everyday	practice	of	culture	the	distinction	is	made	as	an	ongoing	
practice	(Blake	2012,	10;	Morris	2012,	30;	Goldsworthy	2012,	34).	
As	art	was	separated	out	from	entertainment	‐	‘the	sacralization	of	culture’	
(Levine	1988,	83)	‐	a	key	element	of	this	process	involved	changing	the	
relationship	between	audiences	and	the	text	(Storey	2002).	When	Shakespeare	
was	presented	as	entertainment,	audiences	were	rowdy	and	interactive.	But	
when	entertainment	was	turned	into	art,	this	became	a	problem:	
Nothing	seems	to	have	troubled	the	new	arbiters	of	culture	more	than	the	
nineteenth‐century	practice	of	spontaneous	expressions	of	pleasure	and	
disapproval	in	the	form	of	cheers,	yells,	gesticulations,	hisses,	boos,	
stamping	of	feet,	whistling,	crying	for	encores,	and	applause	…	In	1895	
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George	Gladden	compared	applause	to	the	clashing	together	of	spears,	
shields	and	battle	axes	by	primitive	savages	(Levine	1988,	192)	
The	champions	of	the	new,	‘sacralized’	model	of	culture	set	about	‘disciplining	
and	training	audiences’	(Levine	1988,	184),	working	to:	
render	audiences	docile,	willing	to	accept	what	the	experts	deemed	
appropriate	rather	than	play	a	role	themselves	in	determining	either	the	
repertory	or	the	manner	of	presentation	(Levine	1988,	189)	
The	audiences	for	entertainment	are	rowdy.	The	audiences	for	art	are	‘docile’.	
What	does	this	tell	us	about	the	power	relations	between	producers	and	
consumers	in	these	different	forms	of	culture?	
	
Power	to	manage	one’s	own	body	and	contribute	to	a	text	
Starting	with	a	model	of	heterogeneous	powers,	there	are	an	infinite	number	of	
powers	one	could	discuss	in	relation	to	various	forms	of	culture.	To	begin	I	
return	to	the	example	Levine	raises	–	of	bodily	performance	in	response	to	a	text.	
This	fundamental	starting	point	has	broad	implications	for	media	and	power.	
There	are	distinctions	between	what	consumers	are	expected	to	do	with	their	
bodies	at	live	performances	of	art	and	live	performances	of	entertainment.	In	all	
consumption	of	culture	audiences	have	control	over	whether	they	look	or	listen	
at	a	particular	form	of	culture,	whether	they	stay	to	consume	it	or	leave.		But	the	
regimes	of	art	and	entertainment	encourage	them	to	perform	their	presence	
differently.	In	their	physical	comportment	at	a	live	entertainment	event,	
audiences	are	encouraged	to	be	physically	active	–	to	be	loud	and	to	move	
around.	In	their	comportment	at	an	art	event,	they	are	expected	to	be	‘docile’	–	to	
sit	silently	and	still.		
This	point	is	not	made	frivolously.	It	leads	us	to	another	form	of	power	–	the	
power	to	contribute	to	the	cultural	text	itself.	Rowdiness	is	a	form	of	
communication.	To	attend	a	rock	concert	with	a	large	audience	is	clearly	a	
different	cultural	form	from	listening	to	a	recording	of	a	band	–	or	even,	were	it	
possible,	from	listening	to	the	band	perform	live	if	you	were	the	only	person	in	
the	room.	But	this	is	not	so	obviously	true	of	the	audience	at	a	symphony	concert.	
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Indeed,	at	a	symphony	concert	it	could	be	argued	that	other	members	of	the	
audience	are	an	inconvenience.	Coughs	or	mobile	phones	ringing	are	anathema.	
Other	members	of	the	audience	are	prized	to	the	extent	to	which	they	manage	to	
absent	themselves.	When	Arturo	Toscanini	conducted	at	the	Metropolitan	Opera,	
he	‘interrupted	a	performance	of	Weber’s	Euryanthe	to	rap	with	his	baton	until	
the	whispering	stopped’	(Levine	1988,	188).	When	a	consumer	of	art	changes	the	
text	itself	(leading	to	the	conductor	pausing	a	performance),	they	are	chastised	
for	doing	so.	It	is	improper	behavior.	Consumers	of	art	are	–	or	should	be,	ideally	
‐	powerless	to	change	the	text.	It	is	only	when	the	offender	has	been	told	off,	and	
done	what	he	is	told	–	stopped	whispering,	thus	being	returned	to	a	position	of	
powerlessness	–	that	the	performance	can	continue.	
Compare	this	with	the	way	in	which	audiences	of	live	entertainment	can	use	
their	activity	–	which	is	encouraged	by	the	producers	‐	to	alter	the	text	of	the	
cultural	event	itself.	Washington	Irving	wrote	of	nineteenth	century	
entertainment	audiences	that:		
The	good	folks	in	the	gallery	have	all	the	trouble	of	ordering	the	music.	
When	the	orchestra’s	selection	displeased	them,	they	stamped,	hissed,	
roared,	whistled	and	groaned	in	cadence	until	the	musicians	played	Moll	in	
the	Wad,	Tally	ho	the	grinders,	and	several	other	airs	more	suited	to	their	
tastes.	(Levine	1988,	26)	
It	is	still	true	today	that	in	the	creation	of	art,	audiences	must	be	silenced:	
At	a	concert	in	Manhattan	last	week,	the	New	York	Philharmonic	orchestra	
had	just	reached	the	heart‐wrenching	final	passages	of	Mahler’s	Ninth	
Symphony,	when	a	mobile	phone	began	to	ring	from	the	front	row.	It	rang,	
and	rang.	Apoplectic,	the	conductor	halted	the	orchestra	mid‐note.	As	the	
audience	began	to	bay	for	blood,	still	the	phone	chirruped.	The	conductor	
leant	from	the	podium	and	curtly	spoke	to	the	offender.	Finally,	as	if	
coming	out	of	a	trance,	the	man	reached	into	his	pocket	and	switched	it	off	
(Goring	2012,	15)	
Concomitantly,	it	remains	the	problem	of	entertainment	for	many	cultural	critics	
that	the	audience	continues	to	interrupt:	
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I	had	the	misfortune	to	attend	Pavarotti’s	concert	in	Hyde	Park	…	I	moved	
to	various	spots	searching	for	a	place	from	which	he	could	be	heard	to	best	
advantage.	In	every	place	the	majority	reaction	of	the	audience	was	the	
same	–	they	talked,	joked	and	laughed	and	occasionally	jumped	up	and	
down	to	see	if	they	could	see	Pavarotti	on	the	stage,	pausing	only	to	
produce	thunderous	applause	at	the	end	of	each	aria	…	At	the	end	he	was	
vociferously	applauded.	Clearly	the	audience	loved	him;	whether	they	like	
opera	is	something	else	again.	(quoted	in	Storey	2002,	43)	
The	distinction	between	proper	behavior	for	the	consumers	of	art	and	for	
consumers	of	entertainment	retains	a	hold	in	the	models	of	cultural	production	
and	distribution..		
	
The	audience’s	part	in	creating	the	aesthetic	system	of	entertainment	
In	the	‘art’	model	of	culture,	the	text	has	‘the	power’	over	the	audience	–	it	can	
even	change	the	nature	of	the	consumer	by	raising	them	to	‘a	higher	spiritual	
level’.	This	model	also	survives	into	the	twenty	first	century:	for	some	cultural	
critics	the	defining	characteristic	of	‘art’,	as	opposed	to	entertainment,	is	that	it	
can	‘change	lives’	(Morris	2012,	30).	Entertainment	does	not	do	this.	
Entertainment	does	not	‘linger	too	long	in	the	mind’	(Morris	2012,	30).	If	the	
underlying	relationship	of	power	for	art	is	that	the	text	changes	the	consumer,	in	
entertainment	the	fundamental	logic	is	precisely	the	opposite	–	the	consumer	
changes	the	text.	This	can	happen	directly,	as	when	the	audience	calls	out	songs	
for	a	singer	to	perform.	But	it	is	also	important	to	acknowledge	that	the	whole	
system	of	entertainment	is	based	upon	producers	trying	to	understand	
audiences.	This	involves	not	just	the	individual	instances	of	feedback:	but	a	
system	whereby	the	feedback	of	previous	generations	of	consumers	is	drawn	
upon	by	producers	who	want	to	give	the	audience	what	it	wants.	We	can	identify	
a	distinct	aesthetic	system	of	entertainment	–	the	characteristics	that	make	for	
successful	entertainment	products:	vulgarity,	story,	seriality	and	adaptation,	
happy	endings,	interactivity,	a	fast	and	loud	aesthetic,	spectacle,	emotion	and	fun	
(McKee	2012).	It	is	audiences	who	have	created	this	aesthetic	system.	Levine	
notes	that	when	Shakespeare	was	presented	as	entertainment,	taking	on	board	
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the	feedback	of	audiences,	‘Some	of	the	alterations	bordered	on	the	spectacular,	
such	as	the	flying,	singing	witches	in	Macbeth’	(Levine	1988,	42).	One	impresario	
‘devised	a	happy	ending	for	[King	Lear]	…	a	love	affair	between	Edgar	and	
Cordelia	and	allowed	Cordelia	and	Lear	to	live’	(Levine	1988,	44).	Levine	
suggests	that,	unlike	the	situation	with	the	production	of	art	as	culture,	
entertainment	gives	some	element	of	power	over	the	content	of	the	text	to	the	
audience:	
When	in	1826	actor	James	T	Hackett	chided	his	fellow	actor	Edmund	Kean	
about	his	choice	of	Tate’s	ending	[to	King	Lear]	rather	than	Shakespeare’s,	
Kean	replied	that	he	had	attempted	to	restore	the	original,	‘but	when	I	had	
ascertained	that	a	large	majority	of	the	public	–	whom	we	live	to	please	and	
must	please	to	be	popular	–	liked	Tate	better	than	Shakespeare,	I	fell	back	
upon	the	prevailing	corruption;	though	in	my	soul	I	was	ashamed	of	the	
prevailing	taste’.	(Levine	1988,	44)	
In	the	case	of	mediated	culture,	how	does	entertainment	know	its	audiences?	
This	question	is	worth	exploring	for	thinking	about	the	distribution	of	power	
between	media	and	its	audiences.	‘Media’	can	function	perfectly	well	under	the	
cultural	logic	of	either	art	or	entertainment.	The	film	director	Jean‐Luc	Godard,	
for	example,	works	comfortably	within	the	art	model	of	culture,	insisting	that	
‘films	are	made	for	one	or	maybe	two	people’	(quoted	in	Puttman	and	Watson	
1998,	232).	As	the	literary	author	Martin	Amis	puts	it:	
the	idea	of	being	conscious	of	who	you're	directing	the	story	to	is	anathema	
to	me,	because,	in	my	view,	fiction	is	freedom	and	any	restraints	on	that	are	
intolerable.	(Amis,	quoted	in	Page	2011)	
But	it	is	also	possible	for	mediated	culture	to	work	within	the	entertainment	
model	–	seeking	out	the	reactions	of	consumers	and	including	that	in	the	
production	process.	It	is	commonsense,	for	example,	to	assert	that	audiences	of	
Hollywood	movies	do	indeed	have	power	over	the	content	–	indeed,	too	much	
power,	as	we	hear	in	complaints	about	‘the	tyranny	of	focus	groups’	(Lawson	
2011,	34):	
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[Fatal	Attraction]	originally	had	a	rather	arty	conclusion,	in	which	the	
woman,	played	by	Glenn	Close,	commits	ritual	suicide	as	she	listens	to	a	
recording	of	Madame	Butterfly.	Preview	audiences	rejected	the	ending	as	
unsatisfying,	however,	and	…	Paramount	Pictures	had	the	director,	Adrian	
Lyne,	reshoot	it.	In	the	revision,	Ms.	Close's	character	and	her	paramour,	
played	by	Michael	Douglas,	have	a	violent	struggle	in	which	she	is	nearly	
drowned	in	a	bathtub	and	is	finally	dispatched	by	a	gunshot	fired	by	his	
wife	(Anne	Archer).	With	the	new	ending,	Fatal	Attraction	…	earned	more	
than	$300	million	in	box‐office	receipts	worldwide.	(Weber	2011,	16)	
Of	course	there	are	complex	questions	of	epistemology	here.	A	test	audience	is	
not	‘the’	audience.	‘The	audience’	is	an	abstract	entity	representing	all	
consumers:	
In	no	case	is	the	audience	‘real’,	or	external	to	its	discursive	construction.	
There	is	no	‘actual’	audience	that	lies	beyond	its	production	as	a	category,	
which	is	merely	to	say	that	audiences	are	only	ever	encountered	per	se	as	
representations.	(Hartley	1992,	105)	
So	I	am	not	saying	that	focus	groups	accurately	represent	the	audience	–	such	as	
claim	would	be	meaningless.	Rather,	I	argue	that	they	represent	the	desire	of	
entertainment	producers	to	seek	the	input	of	consumers	in	the	production	
process.	This	happens	in	a	number	of	ways.	
Firstly,	the	audience	contributes	through	producers’	historical	knowledge	of	
what	has	succeeded	before.	Creatives	are	valued	in	Hollywood	to	the	extent	that	
they	know	what	audiences	want	to	see.	There	exists	a	whole	industry	for	
analyzing	films	that	have	previously	been	successful	with	audiences	and	drawing	
out	the	common	elements	–	books	like	Robert	McKee’s	Story	(McKee	1998),	for	
example.	
Secondly,	as	noted	above,	Hollywood	has	a	system	of	test	screenings	and	focus	
groups	which	seek	to	find	out	directly	from	audiences	what	they	want	in	a	film.	
Of	course	these	do	not	transparently	tell	producers	what	‘audiences’	think.	They	
are	limited	by	the	same	epistemological	issues	that	constrain	all	qualitative	
research:	the	ways	in	which	questions	are	worded	constrain	responses	(McKee	
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2003,	86),	the	personal	interactions	and	power	relations	between	members	of	
focus	groups	push	responses	in	particular	directions	(McLachlan	2005,	116),	the	
analysis	of	data	can	never	be	objective	in	any	straightforward	way	(McKee	2004,	
204‐205),	and,	of	course,	the	bugbear	of	‘representativeness’	is	always	present	
(McKee	2005,	77).	But	producers	want	to	overcome	these	obstacles	–	they	want	
to	find	ways	to	involve	consumers	in	the	production	of	the	content.	
Thirdly,	when	each	film	is	released	its	performance	is	tracked	in	detail	–	how	
much	money	did	it	make,	over	what	period,	on	how	many	screens,	what	
merchandise	was	released	and	how	well	did	it	sell,	for	example.	
These	processes	are	not	the	same	thing	as	giving	the	audience	a	camera	and	
letting	them	shoot	their	own	film.	They	push	the	production	of	entertainment	
towards	being	acts	of	co‐creation.	A	whole	book	could	be	written	about	the	
relative	input	of	various	actors	into	the	creation	of	such	a	text	–	the	audiences	
who	have	gone	before	and	set	the	limits	on	what	they	want	to	see,	the	creatives	
who	are	also	part	of	‘the	audience’,	the	focus	groups	who	comment	on	drafts	of	
the	product.	But	for	the	purposes	of	this	argument	it	is	necessary	only	note	that	
entertainment	as	a	cultural	system	wants	the	audience	to	play	a	more	important	
role	in	the	creation	process	than	does	art.	Of	course	we	are	not	talking	about	
absolute	free	agency	for	entertainment	audiences	–	as	if	there	ever	were	such	a	
thing.	As	well	as	what	the	audience	wants,	Hollywood	film	producers	also	deal	
with	the	prime	importance	of	making	a	profit	–	so	there	are	always	practical	
limitations	of	what	can	be	seen	on	film,	and	whether	enough	people	want	to	see	
something	to	make	it	commercially	viable.	The	classification	and	wider	legal	
systems	of	any	given	country	put	constraints	on	what	can	be	shown,	and	this	will	
impact,	to	varying	degrees,	on	the	production	process	(Butler	2012).	The	
institutional	and	work	cultures	lead	to	certain	kinds	of	production,	as	do	wider	
economic	conditions	such	as	the	move	to	freelancing	and	contracted	labour	
(Caldwell	2008).	The	histories	of	ideas	and	genres	create	the	culture	within	
which	it	is	possible	to	think.	But	still,	accepting	that	all	of	this	is	true,	
entertainment	wants	to	give	the	audience	what	the	audience	wants.	Art	wants	to	
give	the	audience	what	the	artist	wants.	Of	course	in	practice	things	no	
individual	moment	of	cultural	creation	will	be	as	pure	as	this	schema	suggests.	
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But	hopefully	I	have	in	this	article	provided	sufficient	evidence	to	show	that	
there	exist	different	structures,	and	that	there	is	a	difference	between	
Paramount	Pictures	and	Jean‐Luc	Godard	in	their	attitude	towards	audience	
input	in	the	production	process.	
	
Power	over	the	range	of	cultural	choices	available	
In	this	final	section	I	return	to	a	number	of	points	that	have	been	made	in	this	
article	in	order	to	draw	out	their	implications	for	understanding	the	large‐scale	
systems	of	mediated	cultural	production.	I	would	contend	that	a	familiarity	with	
the	difference	between	art	and	entertainment	as	models	for	the	production,	
distribution	and	consumption	of	culture	speaks	to	another	form	of	power	that	
has	exercised	media	researchers.	Verstraete,	for	example,	argues	that:		
giants	such	as	Time	Warner	Inc.,	Google,	but	also	Yahoo,	Microsoft,	
Vodafone,	T‐Mobile	have	enormous	power	in	deciding	what	entertainment,	
information	and	communication	services	will	be	available	in	what	forms,	
with	which	content.	(Verstraete	2011,	536)	
This	is	a	common	argument	in	academic	writing	about	media	and	power:	
although	consumers	might	have	control	over	the	uses	they	make	of	texts,	
researchers	argue	that	the	power	over	what	texts	actually	get	made	and	
distributed	still	remains	with	the	media	companies	who	produce	them	(Bird	
2011,	508;	Bratich	2011,	623;	Knaggs	2011,	400;	Johnson	2007,	77;	Costello	and	
Moore	2007,	140;	Ornebring	2007,	458;	Madianou	2012,	6).	As	I	have	suggested	
in	this	paper,	this	claim	does	not	take	account	of	different	forms	of	cultural	
production:	the	concerns	of	possible	consumers	of	Fatal	Attraction,	for	example,	
were	listened	to	by	its	makers	more	than	the	concerns	of	possible	consumers	of	
Jean‐Luc	Godard’s	films.	Given	that	this	is	the	case,	why	have	researchers	
continued	to	see	the	producers	of	entertainment	as	having	ultimate	power	over	
the	content	of	material	that	they	produce?	I	suspect	that	the	reason	for	this	can	
be	traced	to	the	different	ways	of	seeing	audiences	in	the	entertainment	and	art	
paradigms.	The	art	paradigm	suggests	that	consumers	should	consume	what	
they	are	given.	The	ideal	arts	consumer	–	if	anyone	ever	managed	to	inhabit	this	
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role	–	would	be	‘docile’	and	take	whatever	they	were	given	by	the	experts,	
whether	they	liked	it	or	not.	I	suggest	that	many	writers	on	media	and	power	are	
working	within	the	‘art’	paradigm	for	culture	–	they	see	all	audiences	as	art	
audiences	–	as	‘docile’	audiences.	But	this	misunderstands	the	nature	of	the	
audiences	of	entertainment	–	and	thus	the	way	in	which	entertainment	is	
produced.	Entertainment	works	on	the	principle	of	‘giving	the	public	what	it	
wants’	(Carey	1992,	6).	In	this	paradigm,	audience	members	are	ill‐disciplined.	
They	wander	away	from	a	piece	of	culture	if	they	are	not	interested.	If	the	artist	
does	not	offer	what	they	want	then	they	seek	it	out	in	other	places.	
The	history	of	British	radio	provides	a	particularly	telling	example	of	this	fact.	
Until	1973	there	was	no	legal	commercial	‘entertainment’	radio	in	the	UK	
(Fleming	2009,	12‐13).	The	BBC	had	a	monopoly	on	radio	in	Britain,	with	a	
‘public	service’	remit	to	produce	material	that	audiences	should	want	–	not	
necessarily	what	they	did	want.	Like	the	cultural	reformers	who	created	the	
category	of	art,	the	BBC’s	Reithian	project	excluded	such	trivial	material	as	the	
pop	charts.	As	rock	and	roll	music	developed	in	the	late	1950s	and	early	1960s:	
‘BBC	policy	makers	continued	to	go	about	their	cultural	missionary	work	much	
as	they	always	had	done’	(Chapman	1992,	1)	
The	Light	Programme	could	embrace	trad	jazz	and	skiffle	readily	enough,	
as	these	satisfied	existing	cultural	criteria,	while	on	the	Home	Service	or	
the	Third	Programme	the	music	could	be	transformed	into	a	series	of	genre	
options,	classified,	made	respectable,	appreciated	rather	than	enjoyed.	
(Chapman	1992,	1)	
But	rock	and	roll	‘was	deemed	to	be	inappropriate	to	the	public	service	pursuit	
of	the	great	and	the	good’	(Chapman	1992,	2)	
Audiences	responded	to	this	control	by	defecting	to	illegal	pirate	radio	stations	
like	Radio	Caroline,	which	were	‘taking	on	the	stuffy	establishment	and	giving	
audiences	alternative	radio	formats’	(Fleming	2009,	35).	By	1968	twenty	one	
pirate	radio	stations	were	broadcasting,	‘with	an	estimated	total	daily	audience	
of	between	10‐15	million’	(Fleming	2009,	35),	presenting	‘a	top	40	music	format	
with	casual,	chatty	links	from	DJs	so	that	in	both	style	and	content	it	was	the	
antithesis	of	BBC	broadcasting	at	the	time’	(Fleming	2009,	36).	‘Entertainment’	
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radio,	offering	the	pop	songs	that	listeners	wanted,	was	not	legally	available.	But	
this	did	not	stop	consumers,	who	sought	out	illegal	alternatives.		
	
Conclusion	
The	question	of	the	relationship	between	media	and	power	continues	to	exercise	
researchers.	In	this	paper	I	have	suggested	that	it	might	prove	useful	to	consider	
the	differences	both	between	different	systems	for	producing	culture	and	
between	different	kinds	of	power.	Lawrence	Levine	has	demonstrated	that	art	
and	entertainment	emerged	as	distinct	cultural	categories	in	Western	countries	
over	the	course	of	the	nineteenth	century.	Mark	Gibson	has	argued	that	it	is	
useful	to	move	away	from	a	monolithic	idea	of	‘power’	as	‘a	single,	objective	
social	phenomenon’	(Gibson	2007,	73).	With	these	perspectives	in	place	we	can	
then	trace	a	number	of	different	powers	in	the	production	of	culture,	and	look	
specifically	at	how	their	distribution	differs	in	the	models	of	art	and	
entertainment.	Consumers	in	liberal	democracies	ultimately	retain	control	over	
the	bodies	–	to	watch	or	not	to	watch	a	text,	to	leave	a	room	and	stay,	stand	and	
cheer	or	sit	in	silence.	This	is	not	an	unimportant	power	–	it	leads	us	to	think	
about	the	contribution	that	consumers	may	make	to	the	process	of	production.	
Entertainment	wants	audiences	to	contribute	to	the	making	of	texts:	at	live	
events	this	happens	directly,	while	in	mediated	events	forms	of	data	gathering	
include	focus	groups	and	the	tracking	of	ticket	sales.	By	contrast,	artists	pride	
themselves	in	not	involving	the	audience	in	production.	As	to	the	question	of	
who	controls	the	range	of	what	forms	of	culture	are	available	–	historically	it	
would	seem	that	while	states	and	large	organisations	can	control	what	is	legally	
available,	if	they	do	not	offer	material	that	interests	consumers,	those	consumers	
will	take	up	other	options	–	either	of	non‐mediated	culture	or	illegally	obtained	
forms	of	mediated	culture.		
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